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Abstract
A recent rise in media attention regarding police discrimination towards minorities has brought
the pervasiveness of biases to the forefront of the public’s attention. In the last decade alone,
countless studies have sought to expand our understanding of the presence of discrimination in
police behavior through detailed analyses of profiling, traffic stops, jury systems, and other key
policies. The continued confirmation of these discrepancies in behavior and their resulting
outcomes inspired a further analysis of their effects on the distribution of parking tickets. We
sought to examine whether this discrimination is a result of peripheral racial biases in which
police officers rely on their heuristics of racial minorities to inform their actions. Since officers
do not interact face-to-face with offenders when issuing parking tickets, is this behavior
indicative of implicit bias?
To better answer this question, we performed a difference-in-differences analysis of parking
ticket distribution in the city of Chicago spanning the last decade between minority and White
police officers based on the districts they patrol. Using a fixed effects linear model, we isolated
police bias in ticketing behavior and concluded that there was no clear trend of racial
discrimination across the police force. However, trends did exist highlighting lenient ticketing
behavior in majority white areas and clear distinctions about how White officers issue tickets
along racial lines.
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I. Introduction
While the debate surrounding racial bias and its implications for our society is not limited
to police behavior, stories detailing irregularities in the execution of standard police duties such
as traffic stops, stop-and-frisk, and arrests have become increasingly prominent in news cycles.
Recent studies of traffic stops, drug wars, police profiling, and jury selection have attempted to
analyze this discrimination in an attempt to understand the proliferation, nature, and extent to
which biases exist amongst officers’ behavior. Particularly intriguing is the role of racial
profiling in discrepancies of police behavior towards the general population. In the book Suspect
Citizens, Baumgartner, Epp, and Shoub examined 20 million traffic stops and discovered that
“Blacks are almost twice as likely to be pulled over as whites- even though whites drive more on
average” and “ just by getting in a car, a black driver has about twice the odds of being pulled
over and almost four times the odds of being searched” (Baumgartner, Epp, & Shoub, 2018).
Their research was furthered by a U.S. Department of Justice examination which noted that
Black residents were more likely to be stopped by police than White or Hispanic residents, both
in traffic stops and street stops (Davis, Whyde, & Langton, 2018). Data on stop-and-frisk
programs as well as traffic stops have been heavily examined by a number of scholars and
consistently show results in line with conclusions of the study by Baumgartner, Epp, and Shoub
(Baumgartner, Epp, & Shoub, 2018). These powerful findings initiated our personal curiosity in
the role and extent of implicit racial biases in all forms of ticketing behavior.
ProPublica Illinois, in partnership with the radio station WBEZ, recently published a
dataset of the City of Chicago parking ticket distribution that included both the unique badge
identification numbers belonging to the officers providing the tickets in addition to relevant
information on the ticket itself: location, vehicle type, violation, etc (ProPublica Illinois &
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WBEZ, 2018). This presented an interesting nuance to recent research on racial bias and
profiling; with a parking ticket, officers typically do not see the owner of the vehicle themselves
so any potential bias would stem from stereotypes, heuristics, and implicit biases based on the
vehicle type and location. We took this opportunity to try to isolate the possibility of implicit
biases present in the act of giving out parking tickets. Chicago served as the primary target for
our research both because of the availability of this data as well as Chicago’s position as one of
the most segregated cities in America, which enhanced the precision of tracking variability in
behavior.
Officers are assigned to specific zones referred to as “beats” in groups of approximately 9
to 10 people which they patrol for approximately a year (Chicago Police Department, 2017).
Beats are designed to help build trust within a community based on the idea that a police officer
who regularly patrols the same area for upwards of a couple of months will better integrate into
communities and become a more trusted resource which will, in turn, help reduce crime (Brown
& Wycoff, 1987). These beats generally cover several zip codes, and the zone a police officer is
patrolling can vary significantly in racial makeup, crime rates, and income as zip codes in
Chicago have vastly different demographics. As a result, an individual officer, in their beat, will
experience significant variation in their day-to-day or week-to-week routines. This was critical
for our research because, for a given beat assignment, we are able to track a group of police
officers’ parking ticket behavior in areas with very different racial composition and analyze this
for possible displays of implicit biases by comparing the behavior of the officers in the beat
patrol with one another. It is interesting to note that because officers patrol the same area over
the course of a year, they are more familiar with the region and thus better able to identify the
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factors presented previously: racial composition, wealth, crime levels, etc., which may influence
their behavior when distributing tickets.
Below, we provide a map of the current police beats in the city of Chicago; there are a
total of 279 beats in Chicago with approximately nine to ten officers assigned per beat (City of
Chicago, 2019).

Exhibit 1: Map of Police Officer Beats in Chicago in 2019.

Our goal was to analyze implicit bias by isolating the behavior of officers of different
races within the same zip code and to use a difference-in-differences analysis to determine
whether their standard behavior significantly diverged from one another along racial lines.
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II. Literature Review
ProPublica examined data on Chapter 13 bankruptcies and concluded that an estimated
1,000 bankruptcies included debts to the city in the form of unpaid tickets with a median value of
$1,500 (Sanchez & Kambhampati, 2018). Since then, the number of cases has increased by 10x
with the median debt owed at $3,900 as the city continues to raise the costs of fines. In
particular, Chicago leads the nation in Chapter 13 filings with ticket debt disproportionately
affecting those in the city’s low-income, mostly Black neighborhoods.
Suspect Citizens (Baumgartner, Epp, & Shoub, 2018) demonstrated, “Blacks are almost
twice as likely to be pulled over as whites,” and a U.S. Justice Department study (Davis, Whyde,
& Langton, 2018) further emphasized, “Black and Latino drivers are more likely to be searched
once they have been pulled over”. Systematic displays of oppression towards minorities are
heavily present in driving and vehicular ownership, and this discrepancy pervades nationwide.
Missouri’s Attorney General’s office reported recently that in 2017, Blacks were 85% more
likely to be stopped at traffic stops (Hawley, 2017). In addition, a study of traffic stops by
Simoiu, Corbett-Davies, and Goel in North Carolina found Blacks and Latinos more likely to be
searched than Whites despite White motorist searches turning up contraband more frequently
(Simoiu, Corbett-Davies, & Goel, 2017). Furthermore, similar figures are reported in related
studies by the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice completed in Ferguson
(United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, 2015), revealing that “black people
[...] account for 85 percent of vehicle stops, 90 percent of citations and 93 percent of arrests,
despite comprising 67 percent of the population.” In Kansas City, “blacks were 2.7 times more
likely to be pulled over in an investigatory stop, and five times more likely to be searched” (Epp,
Maynard-Moody, & Haider-Markel, 2014). Yet another study in Nashville found that “black
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drivers were searched at twice the rate of white drivers, though - as in other jurisdictions searches of white drivers were more likely to turn up contraband” (Gideon’s Army, 2016). For
the purpose of our research, we focused on literature related to discrimination occurring in
situations related to vehicles or driving, but evidence of bias in police behavior extends beyond
these key areas and includes but is not limited to the drug war (Benner, 2002), misdemeanors
(Stevenson & Mayson, 2018), and stop-and-frisk scenarios (Fryer, Jr, 2016).
While not all of this research pertains to parking tickets, these reports’ representation of
the prevalence of discrimination by officers indicates greater structural issues. These issues are
likely manifested in other displays of officer behavior. Implicit biases leading to highly
discriminatory behavior are rarely limited to one situation and form the foundation for our
analysis of parking ticket discrimination. The rising debt reported by ProPublica further
corroborates this belief (Sanchez & Kambhampati, 2018). However, while evidence exists of
disproportionate debt accumulation due to parking tickets, there has been little research thus far
attempting to unearth the presence of clear implicit biases displayed by officers of different races
exemplified through patterns of parking ticket distribution. We seek to add to existing literature
that has sought to understand the presence of officer behavior bias by analyzing its presence, in
the context of parking tickets, within a city where crippling parking ticket debt is heavily taxing
its minority populations.

III. Hypothesis
We hypothesized that White police officers would have a higher likelihood of issuing a
parking ticket in a low-income, predominantly minority neighborhood. In addition, we predicted
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that police officers would give fewer tickets in areas where their race is the majority, i.e., a Black
officer will issue the fewest tickets in a majority Black area.
Parking tickets work differently from other traffic violations because they must be given
solely based on an officer’s judgment of the car and location rather than the driver’s behavior or
appearance. Systematic bias in traffic control has been abundantly addressed in research;
however, we seek to further this research by examining the unconscious biases that may be
apparent in parking ticket distribution due to the inherently unique nature of the ticket itself, i.e.,
no interaction with the owner/driver of the vehicle. We believe that White officers in
neighborhoods with higher minority representation may change their behavior in comparison to
their minority officer counterparts, which will ultimately reveal an increase in the likelihood of
receiving a ticket based on the race of officers and thus provide concrete evidence of the impact
of implicit biases.
We are comparing the behavior of White, Black, Hispanic and Asian officers patrolling
beats together to one another. We believe that officers of minority groups will be least likely to
give tickets to areas dominated by their respective minority groups.

IV. Data
The majority of the data used in our research is from the Chicago Department of Finance
in collaboration with ProPublica Illinois. This dataset contains information on all of the parking
and vehicle compliance tickets issued in Chicago from January 2007 through May 2018. Within
this dataset is information about when, where, and by whom the tickets were issued. While
further information was available about the ticket itself, we focused primarily on these three
principal factors. The data included unique badge ID numbers that could be matched with
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individual Chicago officers and used to trace their parking ticket distribution while they were
active during this timeframe. Publicly, this data did not include the officer names so, in
connection with the Chicago Police Department, we gathered a corresponding dataset through a
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request that allowed us to match the names of officers with
their badge IDs. However, this data merely provided their names and did not include key
demographic information, such as race.
In order to estimate the likely race of officers, we used a validated algorithm that predicts
the race of a person based on their first name by analyzing the statistical probability of a race
based on data from mortgage applications (Tzioumis, 2018). Using linked name and race data
from mortgage loan applications, the algorithm calculates a percentage likelihood that a
particular name for a person is linked to a given race. Six races were used: Black, White, Asian,
Hispanic, American Indian/Pacific Islander/Alaska Native, and two or more races. Due to the
absence of officers identified as American Indian/Pacific Islander/Alaska Native or two or more
races according to this algorithm, we omitted these categories from our analysis. We applied the
algorithm to the names of the Chicago police officers in our dataset in order to calculate the
likelihood of each individual belonging to each of the aforementioned races. We then assigned
each officer to a race based on which statistical probability was highest. With the race
assignment complete, we were able to attach the name and predicted race of an officer with each
of the tickets they gave out between 2007 and 2018.
The next step was gathering zip code-level demographic information. We gathered data
from 58 zip codes in the Chicago area regarding their racial composition, population, income
levels, and crime rates. Population information was taken from the United States Census Bureau
2017 American Community Survey, which included population estimates of each race by zip
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code from 2011 to 2017 (US Census Bureau, 2017). Income information was also taken from the
US Census Bureau using the 2013-2017 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates and
extended from 2009 to 2017 (US Census Bureau, 2017). We used median income to account for
average income by zip code. An example of the racial composition of the zip codes we examined
in Chicago in 2017 can be seen below.

Exhibit 2: Racial Composition by Zip Code in Chicago in 2017. Darkest colors refer to the
highest presence of the title race for each image.

We conducted an estimate of the violent crime rates in each of the zip codes using data
published on the Chicago city website (Chicago Police Department, 2019). This dataset includes
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“reported incidents of crime [...] that occurred in the City of Chicago from 2001 to present.” We
downloaded the data by each zip code and then classified each type of crime as violent or nonviolent based on what we believed classified under the definition of violent crime: behaviors by
persons, against persons or property that intentionally threatens, attempts, or actually inflicts
harm. According to US legal definitions, this includes but is not limited to “aggravated assault,
arson, [...] battery, domestic violence, hate crimes, homicide, manslaughter [...]” (USLegal, Inc.,
2016).

Violent

Non-Violent

Arson
Assault
Battery
Criminal Sexual Assault
Homicide
Kidnapping
Offense involving Children
Robbery
Sex Offense

Burglary
Concealed Carry License Violation
Criminal Damage
Criminal Trespass
Deceptive Practice
Gambling
Interference with Public Officer
Intimidation
Liquor License Violation
Motor Vehicle Theft
Narcotics
Non-Criminal
Obscenity
Other Narcotic Violation
Other Offence
Prostitution
Public Indecency
Public Peace Violation
Stalking
Theft
Weapons Violation

We used violent crime for our research because it creates a more negative perception of
an area, which we believe influences officers’ perspective. Additionally, violent crime is a
common standard for reporting crime rates, especially in Chicago. We used a formula from the
Office of the Attorney General in California in which crime rate is calculated by dividing the
number of reported crimes by the total population in a given zip code and then multiplying by
100,000 (Office of the Attorney General, n.d.). Using this system, we were able to generate an
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overview of the most violent zip codes in Chicago. The graphic below shows the crime rates
during the year 2017 by zip code.

Exhibit 3: Violent Crime Rate by Zip Code in Chicago in 2017. Darkest colors correspond to
highest crime rate.

Summary Statistics
Ultimately our data consisted of tickets issued between 2007 and 2018 and encompassed
a total of 58 zip codes. After cleaning the data, we included a total of 9,333 officers in our study
with 7,938 White officers, 100 Black officers, 1,258 Hispanic officers, and 45 Asian officers. In
total, 3,035,833 tickets were issued with 2,648,929 by White officers, 21,678 by Black officers,
355,818 by Hispanic officers, and 12,183 by Asian officers.
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V. Methodology
We conducted a difference-in-difference analysis in order to assess our research question.
First, we took the following steps to clean our data and eliminate external variable bias in all
tickets given:
A. We first combined our parking ticket data with our police officer data by matching the
officer badge number attached to each ticket with officer names, excluding those that
didn’t match. We then matched each police officer’s name with our database of names
and likely races, removing police officers and their corresponding tickets that didn’t have
likely race data.
B. Once we had tickets matched with the likely race of the ticketing officer, we mapped the
zip code each ticket was issued in with zip code-level demographic information,
including crime rate, median income, and racial profile. By adding these variables, we
could control for zip code fixed effects when building our difference-in-differences
regression.
C. Once we compiled this information, we noticed no officers were assigned into the
American Indian, Alaska Native, Pacific Islander, or multiracial categories, so we
removed those labels from our analysis of police officers. Similarly, when running some
initial tests of our regression, we noticed very low percentages of those racial profiles in
zip codes, giving skewed results, so we combined these with percent Asian, the next
smallest racial group, when examining zip code racial profile.
D. To determine which police officers to remove that wouldn’t be suitable to include in the
difference-in-differences, we next transformed the data with each row corresponding to
the number of tickets an officer gave in a specific zip code in a specific week, looking at
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all officers in all zip codes they patrolled and in every week they gave tickets. We
removed officers who only gave tickets in one zip code over the course of their entire
career since we could not track the difference in their ticketing behavior.
E. We defined an officer’s career in a zip code as starting when they gave their first ticket in
a particular zip code and ending when they gave their last ticket in the zip code. This
way, we could fill in all weeks that the officer didn’t give tickets in their zip code and add
a row specifying zero tickets for each week in between. This meant that our model
captured police behavior with greater accuracy.
This allowed us to create the regression model to determine the impact of race on
ticketing behavior. Our dependent variable was the number of tickets given by an officer in a zip
code in a week. We ran a difference-in-differences regression, taking into account officer, week,
and zip code fixed effects to control for variation along those aspects of the data. Our model was:
𝑌𝑜𝑤𝑧 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1 (𝑟1 ∗ 𝑑1 )𝑜𝑤𝑧 + 𝐵2 (𝑟1 ∗ 𝑑2 )𝑜𝑤𝑧 + 𝐵3 (𝑟1 ∗ 𝑑3 )𝑜𝑤𝑧 + 𝐵4 (𝑟1 ∗ 𝑑4 )𝑜𝑤𝑧 + 𝐵5 (𝑟1 ∗
𝑑5 )𝑜𝑤𝑧 +)𝑜𝑤𝑧 + 𝐵6 (𝑟1 ∗ 𝑑6 )𝑜𝑤𝑧 + 𝐵7 (𝑟2 ∗ 𝑑1 )𝑜𝑤𝑧 + 𝐵8 (𝑟2 ∗ 𝑑2 )𝑜𝑤𝑧 + 𝐵9 (𝑟2 ∗ 𝑑3 )𝑜𝑤𝑧 + 𝐵10 (𝑟2 ∗
𝑑4 )𝑜𝑤𝑧 + 𝐵11 (𝑟2 ∗ 𝑑5 )𝑜𝑤𝑧 + 𝐵12 (𝑟2 ∗ 𝑑6 )𝑜𝑤𝑧 + 𝐵13 (𝑟3 ∗ 𝑑1 )𝑜𝑤𝑧 + 𝐵14 (𝑟3 ∗ 𝑑2 )𝑜𝑤𝑧 + 𝐵15 (𝑟3 ∗
𝑑3 )𝑜𝑤𝑧 + 𝐵16 (𝑟3 ∗ 𝑑4 )𝑜𝑤𝑧 + 𝐵17 (𝑟3 ∗ 𝑑5 )𝑜𝑤𝑧 + 𝐵18 (𝑟3 ∗ 𝑑6 )𝑜𝑤𝑧 + 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑜 + 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑤 + 𝑧𝑖𝑝𝑧 +
𝑒𝑜𝑤𝑧 ,
where Y = number of tickets given by an officer in a zip code in a week, r = race of police officer
(1 = White, 2 = Black, 3 = Hispanic), d = zip code demographic (1 = percentage White, 2 =
percentage Black, 3 = percentage Hispanic, 4 = percentage Asian/other, 5 = crime rate, 6 =
median income), officer = officer fixed effects, week = week fixed effects, and zip = zip code
fixed effects. Since we used interaction terms to pair race of police officer with zip code
demographics, to avoid collinearity, we omitted Asian officers in our regression equation, using
Asian officers in Asian/other zip codes as our reference group. We used this benchmark since it
was the least computationally intensive.
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VI. Results
Table 1: Change in Tickets for One Unit Increase in Demographic Variable
White zip
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian

-0.065
(<0.001)
-0.019
(0.297)
-0.075
(<0.001)
Ref

Black
zip
-0.026
(0.021)
0.027
(0.061)
-0.018
(0.110)
Ref

Hispanic
zip
0.022
(0.027)
-0.014
(0.281)
0.010
(0.344)
Ref

Asian/other
zip
-0.045
(0.028)
-0.033
(0.191)
-0.060
(0.004)
Ref

Crime rate
0.0000055
(<0.001)
0.0000020
(0.228)
0.0000044
(0.002)
Ref

Median
income
0.00000050
(<0.001)
0.00000078
(<0.001)
0.00000096
(<0.001)
Ref

Looking at Table 1, we first read each row individually to compare officer behavior for
officers of different races across different zip code characteristics, then we examine each column
to see overall trends by zip code demographics. By including fixed effects for officers, weeks,
and zip codes in our regression, we can ensure that our findings hold true in the majority of cases
and are not subject to extremities by one particular police officer or in one particular week or zip
code since we examined each officer, zip code, and week individually.
One of the most striking results is for White officers, across the four different zip code
race profiles, they were less likely to give tickets in predominantly White zip codes (6.47% less
likely than Asian officers in Asian/other zip codes) than in any minority zip codes, with Hispanic
(2.21% more likely) and Black (2.59% less likely) zip codes receiving the most and second most
tickets in comparison, respectively. Despite our results being in comparison to Asian officers in
Asian/other zip codes, by comparing only how White officers ticket, we see clear evidence of
skewed ticketing behavior by zip code racial demographics.
A similar analysis among Black and Hispanic officers yields more murky results. For
instance, for Black officers, only ticketing behavior in predominantly Black zip codes produced
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significant results, so we could not see clear evidence for varying ticketing behavior across zip
code racial characteristics. What was interesting, however, was that Black officers demonstrated
a propensity to ticket more in Black zip codes (2.74% more likely) than their White counterparts
in any zip code. For Hispanic officers, insignificant results again prevented us from analyzing
behavior in Black and Hispanic zip codes, but we were able to note that these officers give the
least amount of tickets in predominantly White zip codes (7.53% less likely). They also gave the
second lowest number of tickets in Asian/other zip codes (6.02% less likely), similar to White
officers in the same areas.
Looking to other zip code characteristics, crime rate also impacts ticketing behavior, with
a higher crime rate correlating with an increase in the number of tickets given by White and
Hispanic officers (the effect on Black officers was not statistically significant). Even here,
though, it seems like White officers are more impacted by crime rate than Hispanic officers (1.24
times more likely), with these officers seeing the greatest increase in tickets given in zip codes
with higher crime rates. An increase in the median income of a zip code also correlated with
increased ticketing behavior across all races, a finding that we found surprising since we
expected the opposite to be true. A potential explanation for this might be the influx of tourists
and businesses in these areas that lend themselves towards more potential instances of parking
violations, but this is simply a theory.
What is important to take away from these results, however, is that while there does seem
to exist bias in ticketing behavior among White police officers, we cannot point to a clear trend
of discrimination for all police officers. Crime rate is also a good predictor of ticketing, and
white areas receive fewer tickets than most other minority areas, but we cannot draw overarching
conclusions for discriminatory behavior.
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VII. Discussion
With these results, it is important to keep in mind a few key considerations. First, our
results are consistent for the majority of officers, but this does not mean that outlier officers do
not exist. There will still be racist officers in any police force and officers that give a
disproportionate amount of tickets compared to their peers; our analysis does not hold true for
them. Second, we chose to analyze police discrimination through the lens of parking tickets since
we believed it served as a good proxy to examine implicit bias and ingrained heuristics on the
part of police officers. While we cannot make overarching conclusions about racism within
police forces as it relates to parking tickets, this does not exonerate racist actions in other aspects
of their job.
Despite the strength of our dataset in both its size and completeness, our research had
limitations. First and foremost, we used a proxy to infer the race of police officers rather than
their actual races. Not all minority officers have non-White names (Fryer & Levitt, 2004), so
determining the actual race of these individuals is key in determining the accuracy of our results.
In addition, we did not account for all potential factors that could affect parking ticket
disbursement. For instance, although we ensured variation in zip codes patrolled over the course
of an officer’s career, we could not control for how beats were assigned and whether certain
officers were more likely to be assigned to certain areas. Future studies should replicate this
approach in other cities and use officers’ actual races instead of a proxy.
This study came about from an interest in prior literature on racist police policies like
stop-and-frisk; police discrimination still exists and disproportionately affects minority
communities. Our findings only apply to parking ticket enforcement. This brings up an important
distinction between systematic racism and systemic or structural racism. Despite the fact that we
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could not draw definitive results on implicit bias in police discrimination through parking tickets,
the fact remains that zip codes with predominantly minority communities see higher rates of
parking tickets. The original ProPublica study from which we received our data found this, and
this sort of discrimination is likely a result of poor infrastructure within the city and lack of
investment in these parts of Chicago. Decades of housing discrimination policies have created
segregated neighborhoods that do not receive the same sort of infrastructure investment as whiter
areas, so poorly maintained roads and lack of signage, among other issues, create an environment
where receiving a parking ticket is a lot easier. Combine this inequity of resources with
discriminatory policing behavior beyond parking ticket issuance and minority communities
become victims of an unfair system, incurring financial debt that they often can’t afford and
struggle to escape.
With regards to policy implications, more research must be conducted to find stronger
results that could suggest clearer policy ideas and then analyze the impact of those policy ideas
and their efficacy. Chicago can, in the short term, invest in improved bias training for all police
officers, emphasizing implicit forms of bias that have more subtle effects on police perception.
This sort of training only goes so far but making officers more aware of their natural biases is the
first step in reducing these disparities and creating more impactful policies.

VIII. Conclusion
Through this research, we sought to study whether implicit bias plays a role in parking
ticket disbursement in Chicago. While we were unable to find trends in how all police officers
issue parking tickets when accounting for zip code characteristics, we did conclude that White
officers exhibit racial bias based on the zip code demographics of where they ticket, favoring
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White communities to Black and Hispanic ones. Further research should be done to validate
these results without the use of a race proxy and in other cities, but immediate implementation of
more nuanced bias training should be a short-term goal to mitigate these disparities.
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